Presidential and Parliamentary Systems of Government Essay

Introduction and Main Distinguishing Features of Both Systems: A presidential system of government is one in which there is a head of government, i.e. the executive branch, who is separate from the legislature and is not accountable to it. Generally, the legislature does not hold power to dismiss the executive. This system can be traced back to the monarchal system in the medieval ages which countries such as France, England and Scotland followed where the Crown held all executive powers and not the parliament. When the office of the President of the United States was created, this system of separate powers of the executive and legislature was replicated in the U.S. Constitution. In contrast, a parliamentary system is different from the above because its executive branch of government needs the direct or indirect backing of the parliament to stay in power, which is generally expressed through a vote of confidence. However, the mechanism of checks and balances is different from one found in a presidential republic because there is no distinct separation of powers between the legislature and the executive. In parliamentary systems, the head of government and the head of state are distinct entities, where the former is the prime minister and the latter is an elected president or a hereditary monarch. The U.K. follows a parliamentary form of government, where the prime minister and the cabinet govern using their executive power on a daily basis, but actual authority is held with the head of state.[1] In distinguishing between presidential and parliamentary systems, three points must be considered. First, in a presidential system the head of government (the president) is elected for a fixed term and will serve this unless there is the ‘unusual and exceptional process of impeachment’, whereas in a parliamentary system the head of government (prime minister or equivalent) is dependent on the confidence of the legislature and thus can be removed (along with the whole government) by a motion of no-confidence. Second, in a presidential system the head of government (the president) is popularly elected, if not literally directly by the voters then by an electoral college popularly elected expressly for this purpose, whereas in a parliamentary system the head of government (prime minister or equivalent) is ‘selected’ by the legislature. Third, in a presidential system there is effectively a â€Å"one-person† non-collegial executive, whereas in a parliamentary system the executive (i.e., the cabinet) is collective or collegial.[2] For his part, Sartori like Lijphart, makes three basic points in that ‘a political system is presidential if, and only if, the head of state (president) i) results from popular election, ii) during his or her pre-established tenure cannot be discharged by a parliamentary vote, and iii) heads or otherwise directs the governments that he or she appoints’. There are two distinctions between Lijphart and Sartori worth noting here. First of all, Lijphart refers to the president as the head of government whereas Sartori refers to him or her as the head of state. Second and related, Sartori conceives of the government as being broader than the individual president. As such, Sartori rejects as too narrow the notion ‘that the head of state must also be the head of government’ in favor of a looser notion that authority flows from the president down – perhaps via a separate head of government.[3] Mainwaring attributes two distinguishing features to a presidential democracy. First, the head of government is elected independently of the legislature in the sense that legislative elections and post-election negotiations do not determine executive power. In countries where the chief executive is selected by the legislature, not as a second alternative when the popular vote does not produce a clear winner but as the fundamental process, the system is either parliamentary (the vast majority of cases) or a hybrid (as in Switzerland). Post-election negotiations that determine which parties will govern and which will head the government are crucial in many parliamentary regimes, but they are not part of the selection process of chief executives in presidential systems. The chief executive in a presidential democracy is usually elected by popular vote, although some countries, notably the United States, have an electoral college rather than direct popular elections. Even so, in the United States, the popular vote has a virtually binding effect on Electoral College votes. In other presidential systems, including those in Argentina, Bolivia, and Chile (before 1973), the congress votes for a president if there is no absolute majority in the popular vote. Yet the popular vote is the first criterion, and in Argentina and Chile, tradition has dictated that congress will select the candidate with the most popular votes. Note that it must be the head of government-not simply the president-who is elected by popular vote or an electoral college. In Austria, Iceland, and Ireland, the president is elected by direct popular vote but has only minor powers and is therefore not the head of government.[4] The second distinguishing feature of presidential democracies is that the president is elected for a fixed period of time. Most presidential democracies allow for impeachment, but this practice is rare and does not substantially affect the definition because of its extraordinary character. The president cannot be forced to resign because of a no-confidence vote by the legislature, and consequently, the president is not formally accountable to congress. In a parliamentary system, in contrast, the head of government is elected by the legislature and subsequently depends on the ongoing confidence of the legislature to remain in office; thus the time period is not fixed.[5] Implications for Policy Making and Democracy: Whether a regime is parliamentary or presidential has a major impact on significant aspects of political life: how executive power is formed, relationships between the legislative and the executive branches, relationships between the executive and the political parties, the nature of the political parties, what happens when the executive loses support, and arguably even prospects for stable democracy and patterns of domination. The proponents of presidential claim that presidential systems claim that such systems ensure that the president’s power is a legitimate one because the president if, in most cases, elected directly by the people. The United States follows a different system in which the president is elected by an electoral college but is still considered to be popularly elected. Parliamentary executives can not claim to be elected via a direct vote of the people. Separation of powers is another benefit which the presidential system provides because it established the executive branch and the legislative as two distinct structures which allows each body to supervise and oversee the other and prevents abuse of the system. In a parliamentary system, the executive is not separate from the legislature, reducing the chances of criticism or scrutiny, unless a formal condemnation in the form of a vote of no confidence takes place. Hence, in a parliamentary system, a prime minister’s unethical deeds or instances of misconduct might never be discovered as Woodrow Wyatt (former British Member of Parliament) said while writing about the famous Watergate scandals during the presidency of Richard Nixon, â€Å"don’t think a Watergate couldn’t happen here, you just wouldn’t hear about it.†[6] In a parliamentary system, even though the option of a vote of no confidence is available, it is an option resorted to only in extreme cases. It is considered extremely difficult to influence or stop a prime minister or cabinet who has already decided to pass legislation or implement measures. Voting against important legislation is tantamount to a vote of no confidence, as a consequence of which the government is changed after holding of elections. This is a very tedious process because of which it is a rare occurrence in some parliamentary countries. Britain for example has only rarely undergone such a situation. Therefore, it is often believed that in a parliamentary system, because of the lack of separation of powers, the Parliament can not actually exercise any real control over the executive. However, there can be a downside to separation of powers. Presidential systems can lead to a situations where the President and Congress both evade blame by passing it to the other. In the words of former Treasury Secretary C. Douglas Dillon as he described the United States, â€Å"The president blames Congress, the Congress blames the president, and the public remains confused and disgusted with government in Washington.†[7] Woodrow Wilson agreed in his thesis, Congressional Government in the United States, as he said, â€Å"†¦how is the schoolmaster, the nation, to know which boy needs the whipping? . . . Power and strict accountability for its use are the essential constituents of good government. . . . It is, therefore, manifestly a radical defect in our federal system that it parcels out power and confuses responsibility as it does. The main purpose of the Convention of 1787 seems to have been to accomplish this grievous mistake. The `literary theory’ of checks and balances is simply a consistent account of what our constitution makers tried to do; and those checks and balances have proved mischievous just to the extent which they have succeeded in establishing themselves . . . [the Framers] would be the first to admit that the only fruit of dividing power had been to make it irresponsible.†[8] Separation of Powers has mixed implications. It can lead to gridlock, i.e. when it becomes next to impossible to pass items on the party’s agenda because the legislature is almost equally divided, usually an occurrence in the U.S. when the Senate and House of Representatives are dominated by opposing parties. However, the upside to gridlock is that it often prevents radical policy changes. Another problem with the presidential system is that while it is inherently stable because the president is elected for a fixed term, this also compounds the issue of the presidency being a zero-sum game, where winner takes all. As Linz (1990, 56) states, â€Å"The danger that zero-sum presidential elections pose is compounded by the rigidity of the president’s fixed term in office. Winners and losers are sharply defined for the entire period of the presidential mandate†¦losers must wait four or five years without any access to executive power and patronage. The zero-sum game in presidential regimes raises the stakes of presidential elections and inevitably exacerbates their attendant tension and polarization.† Parliamentary elections can also lead to one party winning an absolute majority, in most scenarios a number of parties gain representation through these elections. Power is often shared and coalitions are formed, as a consequence of which the position holders give due weight to the needs and interests of smaller parties. In turn, these parties expect a certain share in power and as is obvious, are stakeholders in the overall system, instead of non-entities. Now if, as is the case in presidential systems, one sole person believes that he has independent authority and a popular mandate, he might start to develop a tendency towards authoritarianism. When he develops such notions about his standing and role, he will not react appropriately to the inevitable opposition to his policies, finding it annoying and unsettling, as would a prime minister who considers himself a mere representative of a temporary governing coalition and not the sole voice of the nation. Hence the examples of Venezuela and Colombia, where when democracy was reestablished in times of great political instability, and when the written constitutions warranted a presidential government, the leaders of chief political parties opted for consociational agreements whereby the rigid, winner-take-all consequences of presidential elections were â€Å"softened†.[9] While stability is often touted as one of the prime advantages of the presidential system, it is simply another word for rigidity. On the other hand, parliamentarism lends a certain element of flexibility to the political process. Advocates of presidentialism might reply that this rigidity is actually a plus because it prevents the uncertainty and instability so definitive of parliamentary politics. Under parliamentary government, after all, a number of entities, even rank-and-file legislators, can choose to adopt basic changes, cause realignments and shifts, and, most importantly, make or break prime ministers. But it must be remembered that while the need for authority and predictability might serve as justifications for presidentialism, there can be a myriad of unexpected developments- anything from the death of the incumbent to serious errors in judgment committed under the pressure of adverse political circumstances – that often lead to the presidential rule being less predictable and often weaker than that of a prime minister. The latter can always make efforts to bolster up his legitimacy and authority, be it through a vote of confidence or the dissolution of parliament and the consequential new elections. Also, a prime minister can be changed without it necessarily leading to a major regime crisis.[10] Conclusion: The above analysis has largely favored a parliamentary system over a presidential one. However, one must remember that success regimes, regardless of the amount of thought and care gone into their design, are determined by the extent of support they manage to arrest from society at large, its major forces, groups and institution. Public consensus therefore is a basic need, which confers legitimacy to the authority of the regime, and this is achieved only by the power which is attained lawfully and in a democratic fashion. Regimes also depend to a large extent on the ability and aptitude of their leaders to govern, to arouse trust and to respect the boundaries of the power they hold. Every country has unique aspects that one must take into account-traditions of federalism, ethnic or cultural heterogeneity, and so on. Both systems have their pros and cons, even parliamentary systems can suffer grave crises. Hence, countries must consider their own individual past, present and future, in order to determine which system has the greater probability of success. References Hardin, Charles. 1989. A Challenge to Political Science. PS: Political Science and Politics 22(3): 595-600. Lijphart, Arend, ed. 1992. Introduction in A. Lijphart (ed.), Parliamentary versus presidential government. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Linz, Juan. 1990. The Perils of Presidentialism. Journal of Democracy (Winter): 51-69. Mainwaring, Scott and Shugart, Matthew. 1997. Juan Linz, Presidentialism, and Democracy: A Critical Appraisal. Comparative Politics 29(4): 449-471. Mainwaring, Scott. 1990. Presidentialism in Latin America. Latin American Research Review 25(1):157-179. Sartori, Giovanni. 1994. Neither presidentialism nor parliamentarism, in J.J. Linz & A. Valenzuela (eds.), The failure of presidential democracy, vol. 1: Comparative perspectives. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. Thomas, Jo. Oct. 9 1988. The fate of two nations. The New York Times. Wilson, Woodrow. 1886. Congressional Government: A Study in American Politics. The New Englander 45(192). [1] Mainwaring, Scott and Shugart, Matthew. 1997. Juan Linz, Presidentialism, and Democracy: A Critical Appraisal. Comparative Politics 29(4): 449-471. [2] Lijphart, Arend, ed. 1992. Introduction in A. Lijphart (ed.), Parliamentary versus presidential government. Oxford: Oxford University Press. [3] Sartori, Giovanni. 1994. Neither presidentialism nor parliamentarism, in J.J. Linz & A. Valenzuela (eds.), The failure of presidential democracy, vol. 1: Comparative perspectives. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. [4] Mainwaring, Scott. 1990. Presidentialism in Latin America. Latin American Research Review 25(1):157-179. [5] Linz, Juan. 1990. The Perils of Presidentialism. Journal of Democracy (Winter): 51-69 [6] Thomas, Jo. Oct. 9 1988. The fate of two nations. The New York Times. [7] Hardin, Charles. 1989. A Challenge to Political Science. PS: Political Science and Politics 22(3): 595-600. [8] Wilson, Woodrow. 1886. Congressional Government: A Study in American Politics. The New Englander 45(192). [9] Linz, Juan. 1990. [10]   Linz, Juan. 1990.